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THE COILLUDING AND THE MISTAKEN TRUSTEE
The Harvard Law Review' criticizes a Kentucky decision,
Wilson v. Louisville Trust Company 2 and seems to regard the
'conclusion as one result though not a necessary result of the
reasoning in Wet more v. Porter.3 In the latter case it was
held that a trustee who colludes with a confederate may repent
and bring an action against the confederate for the restoration
of the trust property. In the Kentucky case it was held that
the trustee alone had the power to bring the action, and if he
failed to do so the infant beneficiary was bound after the statute
of limitations had run against the trustee. In Wetmwre v.
Porter4 it seems clear that no wrong had been done to the trustee since he had consented to the transaction but it would appear that a tort had been committed to the beneficiary and the
latter should have an independent right of action against the
confederate. In such case the beneficiary should be bound by
his own laches only, and not by the neglect of the trustee. It
seems then, that in such case, the cestui que trust has a choice
whether he will bring an action independently or whether he
will permit. his interests to be vindicated through the trustee.5
A somewhat similar result was reached in Francis Oil -Ca. v.
Mansville 00.6 Here a* corporation, through its officers, had
conspired with a broker whereby its present stockholders were
fraudulently induced to buy more of its stock. On failure of
the broker to account for the proceeds of sales, it was held
that the corporation could maintain a bill in equity. The suit
was recognized as an action for and in behalf of the stockholders,
though a certain small number, namely the officers-stockholders,
who had committed the wrong, would also benefit by a recovery.
'Where there is negligent non-action by the trustee it is
commonly said that the cestui que trust, though not sui juris,
is bound when the statute of limitations has run against the
112 Harv. L. Rev.133 (1898).
'102 Ky.522 (1898) 12 A. L. R. 132 (1898).
'92 N. Y. 76 (1883).

Bupra, note 3.

'11 Col. L. R. 686.
a296 F. 349, 352 (1924).
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trustee.7
The only right or power belonging to the cestui
quo trust is that of compelling the trustee to do his duty, in
which action he may join the third party8 to avoid circuity
of action.0 It therefore appears that there is a sharp distinction between negligent or wilful non-action and wilful or
fraudulent performance.
The criticism above referred to implies a condemnation of
the theory as to the power of the colluding trustee to sue because, granted once the trustee may sue, courts are likely to
reach the conclusion that he only may sue, and if he does not
sue the cestui que trust is bound by the failure of the former
to bring an action within the proper time. The Kentucky
court is accused of adopting this -non-sequitur. Is this a proper
criticism I
There are five situations which it may be important to
distinguish: (a) the trustee negligently fails to act, as in
Wycl7b v. East India Company"°; (b) the trustee colludes with
a confederate, as in Wetmore v. Portdr; (c) the trustee acts
negligently but without bad faith and the obligor acts without bad faith but with notice, as in Price v. Blakemore"-; (d)
the trustee acts in good faith and exercises such judgment as
the average man under similar circumstances would exercise
and the third party acts in good faith but with notice, as in
Willson v. Louisville Trust Company' 2 ; (e) the trustee acts
in good faith but is overreached by the third party, as in Elliott
v. Landis Machine Company. 3
Presumably the author of the note above referred to' 4 distinguishes only between non-action on the one hand and some
t Wyeh v. East India Co., 3 P. Wins. 309 (Ch. 1734).
'The term "third party" will be used for convenience in this discussion to designate the person who deals with the trustee having
notice of the trust, though it does not accurately describe him. The
term "confederate" is used where there is collusion.
*Fogg v. Middleton, 2 Hill Ch. 591 (S.-C. 1837).
"Supra, note 7.
2 6 Beav. 507 (Ch. 1843). Here trustee joined life tenant in conveying the trust property and negligently permitted him to buy other
property with the proceeds and take legal title in fee in his own name.
It was held that the trustee was the one to sue to enforce the trust
rather than.the remaindermen-beneficiaries.
uBupra, note 2.
u236
Mlo. 546, 139 S. W. 356 (1911); 11 Col. L. Rev. 686 (1911).
14

Supra, note 1.
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mistaken or collusive action by the trustee on the other hand.
In the former case the cestui que trust has no independent
cause of action against the third party, but in the latter case
he should always have one, no matter what the circumstances.
The good or bad faith of the trustee or of the third party is
regarded as without significance. But is that a sound and
proper conclusion?
It might be assumed that a colluding trustee was in pari
delicto and therefore precluded from bringing an action.' 5 No
case has been found where recovery was refused expressly on
that ground. In fact, none of the exceptions noted by Professor Woodward fit him.' 6 When therefore, he is allowed to
recover, it must be not because of his own merit, but because
this method is convenient for the beneficiary. It is generally held that a debtor who transfers his property to
a transferee with notice in fraud of his creditors, may
le is in pari delicto
not himself sue and recover.
with his grantee. 17 There is the exception where he conveys to
his attorney on the latter's advice.' s A very similar thing occurs where the trustee and the cestui que trust conspire together
to convey trust-property to another person to protect the estate.
Thus in Place v. Hayward,19 the executor-trustee, with the connivance of the beneficiary, transferred the estate to protect the
settlor's husband, the beneficiary, from the claims of his creditors. The court found that there was no intent to defraud the
creditors of the estate, and no actual intent to defraud anyone,
and allowed the trustee to recover the property.
Of course if a colluding trustee may sue, a trustee who
acts mistakenly but in good faith should be able to sue. If
the mistaken trustee, acting in good faith, or the colluding
trustee, may sue, his co-trustee should be able to sue the third
party,20 and if such trustee is removed his successor should be
"See Woodward on Quasi-Contracts sec. 135 (1912).
" Op. cit. sec. 136-146.
"Atwood v. Lester, 20 R. I. 660, 40 A. 866 (1898); 12 Harv. L. Rev.

359 (1898).
"Goodenough v. Spencer, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 248 (N. Y. 1874); Place
v. Hayward, 117 N. Y. 495, 23 N. E. 25 (1889).

" Supra, note 18.

2*Bayard v. Wooley, 20 Beav. 385 (Ch. 1855); Franco v. Franco, 3

Yes. Jr. 75 (Ch. 1796); Clemens v. Heckscher, 185 Pa. 476, 40 A. 80
(1898).

THE COLLUDIN

AD
M THE MISTAKEN Tnusn

able to sue.2 ' All this has nothing to do with the question
whether laches or the statute of limitations will prevent the
beneficiary from suing the trustee. Presumably after there is
a repudiation of the trust by the trustee of which the beneficiary
22
has notice, the statute of limitations or laches binds the latter.
But some courts deny a trustee who has mistakenly acted,
any power to sue at all. He is not denied the power to sue on
the ground of being in pari delicto because the very assumption
here is that there is no deliotum. Surely if he has acted mistakenly but with good faith and without negligence, he is not
liable to the beneficiary. He does not always act at his peril.
He is estopped from suing, say these courts, because he cannot
deny his own conveyance.

Parker v.

HaZZ23

is commonly as-

sumed to deny only the power of the colluding trustee to sue,
and so is assumed to be sound, because under these circumstances
a right of action is acknowledged to exist in the cestui que
trust. But while the situation before the court was parallel to
that in Wetmore v. Porter, in fact the court goes much further
than simply to deny to the colluding trustee a power to sue. It
denies every trustee who has mistakenly acted a power to sue,
and affirms that the cestui que trust only can sue, and therefore

there can be no issue whether the statute of limitations which
otherwise would have run against the trustee, affects an infant
beneficiary. "That doctrine" (that when the trustee is barred
the beneficiary is barred) "only applies where the trustee could
sue but fails to do so, as where a stranger intrudes himself into
the trust estate and holds wrongfully and adversely both to
the trustee and to the beneficiaries. " 2 4 That is, the cestui que
trust is bound only by negligent non-action of the trustee, and
not by his acts, however much he may have acted in good faith,
but the latter is bound by his own acts and cannot repudiate
them. There are several other jurisdictions which have denied
the trustee a power to sue after he has mistakenly acted.2 5
n Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 A. 819 (1906);
Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 20 A. 313 (1890).
2Rosson v. Anderson, 9 B. Mon. 423 (48 Ky. 1849).
2 Head 641 (Tenn. 1859).

Supra, note 23.

Chase v. Cartwright, 53 Ark. 358 (1890); Herron v. Marshall, 5
Humph 443 (Tenn. 1844); Elliott v. Landis Machine Co., supra, note
13; Coker v. Hughes, 205 Ala. 369, 87 So. 321 (1920).-
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It is more generally held however, that where a trustee
mistakenly acts in good faith and makes an improper disposition of trust property, he and he only may still recover the
same.26 If this be a sound result (and it is supported by the
Supreme Court of the United States),27 then the cestui que trust
is bound by failure of the trustee to sue the third party. If the
trustee cannot sue at all, then of course no question arises about
the cestui que trust being'bound. All cases which note the problem at all have held that if the mistaken trustee acting in
good faith may sue, the cestui quo trust is bound by his failure
25
to do so.
It has been argued that the difference between negligent
non-feasance by the trustee and good faith but mistaken feasance
is that in the former case the cestui que trust has only a right
to compel the trustee to perform, but in the latter case he has
acquired rights independent of those of the trustee against the
third party taking trust property with notice; that in the former
case the beneficiary is bound by the non-action of the trustee
when the statute of limitations has run, but in the latter case
he is not so bound.2 9 But this distinction seems shadowy unless
in the latter case the third party dealt fraudulently and collusively with the trustee. The failure to undo his own deed
is also negligent non-action. If a fraud has been committed upon the trustee3" it is of course the same act which injures the
beneficiary. But surely the trustee should be able to recover for
the wrong, and there is the same policy involved as there is in
Wych v. East India Company to hold that the cestui que trust
should be bound.
In Missouri there is a curious distinction made. In Ewing
v. Shannahan31 where the trustee in good faith reconveyed
premises to the settlor S, to assist the latter in revoking the
2
'tMeeks v. Olpherts, 100 U. S. 566 (1880); Emilie v. Biffle, 2 Pa. St.
52 (1845); Wingfield7 v. Virgin, 51 Ga. 139 (1874); Molton v. Henderson, 62 Ala. 426 (1878); Lee v. Horton, 104 N. Y. 540, 11 N. E. 50 (1887);
Place v. Hayward, supra, note 18; Abbott v. Reeves, 49 Pa. St. 491
(1865); Greenwood v. Wakeford, 1 Beav. 576 (Ch. 1839).

" Meeks v. Olpherts, supra, note 26.
"See cases cited in note 26, supra, and cf. 11 Col. L. Rev. 686
(1911).
"11 Col. L. Rev. 686 (1911).
0Elliott v. Landis Machine Co., supra, note 13.
1113 Mo. 196, 20 S. W. 1065 (1892).
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trust, it was held that the beneficiaries were bound by the adverse possession of S. But in Elliott v. Landis Machine Company32 it was held. that the cestui que trust was not so bound.
In this latter case the trustee was imposed upon by intermediaries and did not deal directly with the purchaser, though the
latter had notice of the trust. In the former case it was held
that since the trustee had held the legal title he had the sole
right of action. But that result was denied in the latter case.
The court seeks to bring this within some rule like that in
Parker v. Hall3 3 that a guilty trustee cannot sue; hence, the
cestui que trust is not bound by the statute of limitations. It
declares the difference between the two cases to be that in the
first case the trustee dealt directly with the purchaser, whereas
in the second he dealt through intermediaries. This seems to
be a distinction without a difference, and c6nflicts with Wetmore v. Porteras to the right of action in the trustee. In Wetmore v. Porter the court however, makes no observation as to
whether, if the trustee should not sue, the statute would run
as against the cestui que trust. There is, however, this distinction-that the trustee in the latter Missouri case was overreached, which was not true in the former. This wrong, however, seems to be one directed against the trustee rather than
against the cestui quo trust, and for such wrong surely the
trustee should have a right of action. As there is no real distinction between the two cases, Missouri must now be regarded
as adopting the rule of Parker v. Hall in Tennessee that both
the mistaken and the colluding trustee are estopped from bringing an action.
If the trustee can bind the cestui que trust by negligent
non-action, why should not his mistaken action bind the cestui
que trust? There is the same policy of repose involved. Wliere
the trustee has negligently acied, the beneficiary has a cause
of action against him rather than against the third party. Unless the third party has colluded he has done no wrong to the
cestui que trust and the latter should not have an independent
action. It is conceived that a wrongful act not collusive, is a
wrong to the trustee and not to the cestui que. trust. If the
" Supra, note 13.

=Supra, note 23.

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
trustee refuses to proceed to right the wrong, then as in other
cases, the cestui que trust should be able to sue the trustee and
join the third party in one suit. It is believed that in such
case the right of action to repudiate the transaction should
be in the trustee, and the eestui que trust should be bound by
the failure of the former to repudiate it. Therefore Willson v.
Louisville Trust C0.34 seems sound. There is nothing to show
that if the Kentucky Court were faced with the problem which
arose in Wetmore v. Porterit would not follow the same course
and permit the cestui que trust a choice of two methods of procedure.
We may draw the following conclusions:
(1) A trustee is not subject to the rule applied to persons in pari delicto. (2) Some courts deny him a right of
action where he has acted mistakenly because he cannot question his own conveyance, whether made in good or bad faith.
But just as the better view permits the personal representative
to sue a grantee who had received a debtor's property in the
life time of the debtor in fraud of his creditors 35 because he
represents claimants against the estate as well as the deceased,
so does the mistaken trustee represent the cestui quo trust as
well as himself, and he should be permitted to sue. If however,
the trustee cannot sue, the cestui que trust should be able to
sue and his right should not be affected save by his own laches.
(3) Where there is collusion some courts allow the right of the
cestii que trust to be asserted either by himself or by the colluding trustee. Presumably when the right is so asserted by
either, the other cannot thereafter sue. Certainly if the cestui
que trust permits the trustee to sue, his right of action in
equity should be foreclosed; (4) It is difficult to find an essential difference between negligent nonaction by the trustee, and
good faith but mistaken dealing by him with a third party who
also deals in good faith.
If Wyclk v. East India Co. continues to represent the law,
then Willson v. Louisville Trust Co. should also reach a sound
result. This accords with the orthodox theory that the cestui
que trust's sole right is against the trustee, and that he does
1Supra, note 2.
=Buehler v. Glonnger, 2 Watts 226 (Pa. 1834).
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not have an in. rem interest in the property. Recent cases however, which have permitted the cestui que trust to sue the obligor
directly when it was not feasible to join the negligent trustee,
raise a serious issue whether in all cases the cestui que trust has
not a larger interest than a mere right to hold a trustee to his
duty. But they do not as yet go the length of overruling the
principle involved in Wyeh v. The East.India Co.
ALvnv E. EvANs

